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Delaying Repatriation: Japanese Technicians in Early Post-war China 
Over the last decade or so, interest in the repatriation of the Japanese
1
 civilian citizens who 
resided in the former Manchukuo at the time of the Japanese surrender has attracted 
increasing scholarly attention. This research has overwhelmingly focussed on the Japanese 
citizens who wished to return to Japan and the difficulties – personal and political - they 
faced in order to do so.
2
 As research as focussed primarily on the Japanese who wanted to 
return to Japan as soon as possible, an assumption that all Japanese wanted to return to Japan 
has developed. Yet, as this paper shows, not all Japanese wanted to immediately return to 
Japan and some made the conscious decision to remain in China, at least in the short to 
medium term.  
 
This paper examines the issue of the repatriation of the Japanese from Manchukuo in terms 
of the concepts of involuntary and voluntary repatriation. Specifically, the analysis covers the 
political and functional realities faced by some of the technicians from the South Manchurian 
Railroad Company’s (hereafter Mantetsu) Central Research Laboratories (hereafter CRL), 
when making their decisions as to whether to stay or to leave.  Importantly, the reasons 
behind the technicians’ decision to stay differed depending on the individual and across time. 
The paper develops these ideas using biographical information and jibunshi (self-histories) 
written on or by the technicians. Whilst I accept Figal’s (1996, p. 916) argument that the use 
of jibunshi can be problematic because they often lack critical  reflection and are written a 
long time after the events covered, I believe that they are useful indicators of the situations 
that the authors found themselves in and the decisions they faced. I therefore use them for 
these purposes. 
 
Involuntary versus Voluntary Repatriation 
In its broadest terms, repatriation means the return of citizens to their homeland. This return 
may involve either an international or an intra-country movement and either can follow 
natural disasters or the end of conflict. The time lag between the departure from the 
homeland and a repatriate’s return can vary from a matter of days to months or even years. 
Importantly, repatriation can be either voluntarily (freely) or involuntarily (forcibly) made. 
Whilst the conditions in either or both the departure point and the destination can play a role 
in whether a person wishes to be repatriated or not, the distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary repatriation is primarily lies in whether the repatriate chooses to leave the 
departure point or not. Put simply, where a repatriate chooses to leave the point of departure, 
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then their repatriation is voluntary but where they are forced to leave against their wishes, 
then their repatriation is involuntary. However, repatriation in its entirety is more complex 
than a simple choice between leaving or not: it also involves issues such as the timing of the 
repatriation and the destination. As an example, a repatriate may wish to leave their departure 
point but may not be allowed to leave when they want to. In such cases, repatriation is not 
completely voluntary and therefore is partly an involuntary repatriation. Sakama Fumiko’s 
repatriation from the Soviet Union in 1955 for instance, was voluntary in that she wanted to 
leave but it was also involuntary in that her destination was not Dalian, the city she 
considered ‘home’, but Japan where she had never previously been (Sakama 1955). As such, 
her repatriation was not completely voluntary. In effect, involuntary repatriation is broader 
than the issue of being forced to leave but also includes situations where a repatriate does not 
consent to one element of their repatriation whether it be when, where to or whether they 
actually want to make the journey or not.  
 
The flipside of non-repatriation is a continued stay in the potential point of departure. Where 
people do not wish to leave, then their stay is voluntary but when they want to leave but are 
unable to do so, their stay is involuntary. The Japanese in the former Manchukuo are often 
assumed to have wanted to be repatriated to Japan and therefore their repatriation is usually 
thought of as being voluntary and until their repatriation, their stay is assumed to have been 
involuntary. However, as is shown below, for some people, the situation was more complex 
than these assumptions allow.  
 
Background to the Repatriation of Japanese from the former Manchukuo 
On 26 July 1945, Great Britain, the United States and the Kuomintang governments outlined 
their terms under which they would end their war with Japan in the Potsdam Declaration.  
The Soviet Union, which was to invade Manchukuo on 9 August, was a signatory to a 
neutrality agreement with Japan at the time and consequently was not party to the declaration. 
Clause 9 of the declaration reads:  
The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to 
return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. 
 
This text formed the foundation of the organisation of the repatriation of the Japanese 
overseas. The wording of the declaration indicates an assumption by its signatories that the 
Japanese would want to return to Japan. However, as Kobayashi (2000: 167-168) notes, 
Clause 9 does not include any provision for the repatriation of Japanese civilians. Yet, around 
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half of the estimated six million Japanese overseas in August 1945, were civilians. Around 
1.2 million were in Manchukuo where another half a million Japanese military personnel 
were stationed. The wording of Clause 9 also indicates an expectation that repatriation 
programs would be available. In the case of military personnel across the Pacific, such 
programs were quickly put in place and repatriation was largely complete by the end of 
1946.
3
 In the case of the former Manchukuo however, it was May 1946 – almost nine months 
after the Japanese surrender - before the first Japanese were repatriated from Hulutao and it 
was December 1946 before any departed Dalian.   
 
Shortly after Japan’s unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945, the United States realised 
the limitations of Clause 9 and subsequently reconsidered its policies towards repatriation.  
Its new policy read:  
First priority will be granted to the movement of Japanese military and naval personnel, 
and second priority to the movement of Japanese civilians (in MacArthur General Staff 
1948: 151).  
 
According to Yang (1998: 192) this change in the American position was due to a view 
outlined in the Far Eastern sub-committee of the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee 
that any Japanese civilians who remained in China did so with the aim of assisting in a 
resurgence of Japanese power. Irrespective of what drove the change, the new policy 
constitutes the first official recognition of the existence of the Japanese civilians and the need 
to provide for their repatriation. Despite the change in policy however, the main focus of the 
repatriation programs remained on the demobilisation and repatriation of military personnel 
and the plans for the repatriation of the Japanese civilians focussed more on the practicalities 
of their transportation to Japan in the assumption that the Japanese wished to be repatriated.   
 
Manchukuo 
The state of Manchukuo was established by the Japanese Government in March 1932. Over 
the ensuing 13 years, the Japanese population in the region grew as unskilled workers, skilled 
technicians and agrarian settlers migrated from Japan. These new migrants were in addition 
to the Japanese who had emigrated to the region after Japan assumed control over the 
Liaodong Peninsula following the Russo-Japan war of 1905.
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 Among the skilled emigrants 
were expatriate workers sent to Manchukuo by their employers. These included technicians 
employed by the Minami manshū testudō kaisha (South Manchuria Railroad Company), or 
Mantetsu. By the time Manchukuo disappeared in August 1945, some families, such as the 
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Kuramoto family, had been in Manchukuo for three generations (Kuramoto 1999: x) but 
many had been there only a matter of years and in some cases, only a few months. Okumura 
Kiyoaki and his family, for instance, left Osaka on 27 May 1945 and had only arrived in 




Within a week of the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo on 9 August 1945, Japan had accepted 
an unconditional surrender. By the time of the ceasefire in Manchukuo on 19 August, the 
Soviet Army, which had met only sporadic resistance from the Kwantung Army, had almost 
reached the old border with China. The Soviet Union would remain in control of most of the 
former Manchukuo until its withdrawal in May 1946.
5
   
 
The power vacuum that emerged after the Soviet withdrawal saw control of some areas of the 
former Manchukuo swing back and forth between the Chinese Communists and the 
Kuomintang as the Chinese civil war raged. The effect of both the Soviet invasion and the 
Chinese civil war on the Japanese and Chinese civilian populations was immense.  It is 
estimated that around 162,000 Japanese citizens, including many women and children, died 
in the 19 months after the Japanese surrender (Nimmo 1988: 28). Another 594,000 Japanese 
men and women were transported to the Soviet Union where they were forced to work 
(Kirichenko 2003: 8). The instability also had major repercussions for the employment of the 
Japanese.  Some continued to work in the same jobs they had held before the Japanese 
surrender but many others eked out a living the best way they could until they could leave. 
The extended Kuramoto family for instance, sold tempura as well as the family’s jewellery 
and kimonos from booths located in a former department store (Kuramoto 1999: 87-88). 
 
Repatriation of Japanese citizens from Manchukuo 
Whilst under Soviet rule, no Japanese citizens were repatriated directly from the former 
Manchukuo to Japan. In May 1946, repatriation ships left Huludao – outside the former 
Manchukuo - carrying Japanese citizens who had managed to leave areas under Soviet 
control.  Besides some Japanese who had fled across the Korean peninsula and were 
repatriated from there, the people aboard the ships leaving Hulatao were the first Japanese 
civilians from the former Manchukuo to return to Japan. Repatriation from Dalian began in 
December 1946, more than six months after the Soviet withdrawal. Repatriation continued at 
irregular intervals until September 1949 when the transportation of all Japanese from the 
newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) was suspended. A second repatriation 
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program, operated under the auspices of the Japanese and Chinese Red Cross, commenced in 
1953 and continued on an irregular basis until 1958 when all repatriations programs were 
terminated. Japanese citizens who were unable to exit China under these programs were 
effectively forced to remain in the PRC until diplomatic relations between the two countries 
were established in September 1972.
6
   
 
The effect of the stop-start nature of the repatriation programs was multilayered.  On one 
hand, whenever repatriation was not permitted, the Japanese civilians were forced to remain 
in China. That is, they had little choice as to whether to leave or not and therefore, were 
involuntarily forced to stay.  On the other hand, when a repatriation program was in place, 
some Japanese were encouraged to leave whilst others were discouraged from doing so. That 
is, some were able to voluntarily leave and others were involuntarily made to stay. The 
authorities – both in Japan and in China - generally assumed that the Japanese would want to 
leave and worked towards enabling this to occur. However, some Japanese, particularly those 
with a job and those who were born and raised there, wished to stay. In the case of those who 
were working, the decision to stay was often a pragmatic decision driven by a belief that they 
may not be able to obtain employment in Japan due to the depressed conditions there.  
 
The Chinese Communists and Kuomintang took similar positions vis-à-vis the repatriation of 
the Japanese in areas under their control. The Kuomintang largely encouraged Japanese 
citizens to return home although they preferred technicians to stay (Fukushima 1955: 179).  
According to Nimmo (1998: 28), quoting figures from a May 1947 cable from the American 
Ambassador in China, around 11,300 Japanese technicians were employed by the 
Kuomintang. Later, as the Kuomintang’s control deteriorated, it began encouraging the 
Japanese technicians to leave so that they would not be able to assist the Communists 
(Nagami 2006: 101). Similarly, the Communists wanted the Japanese technicians to stay 
since they wanted to utilise their skills in the redevelopment of infrastructure and the training 
of local workers (Nagami 2006: 101). According to Chan (2006: 59), the Communists vetted 
the Japanese repatriates, allowing those without special technical skills to leave but prevented 
those with the skills they needed from leaving. For the Japanese technicians themselves, such 
policies saw some voluntarily return to Japan but for others it became an involuntary stay in 
China. In effect, views toward repatriation differed among the various political powers as 





Mantetsu or ‘The South Manchuria Railroad Company’ was established in 1906 with its 
headquarters in Dalian.
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 By the 1930s it had monopolistic control over the main industries 
across Manchukuo but a restructure late that decade saw it lose many of its monopolies (Nish 
1998: 183). Nevertheless, Mantetsu still remained a highly influential company in the region 
not least of all due to its control over the railway system. For many years, Mantetsu was 
considered as a desirable employer and consequently attracted some of Japan’s best 
graduates.   
 
Throughout its history, Mantetsu consciously remained a Japanese company and decision 
making remained firmly in Japanese hands.  In line with this philosophy, non-Japanese 
workers were mostly employed in lower paid and unskilled positions (Nagami 2003: 9) and 
Japanese workers were employed in managerial and skilled positions.  This strategy was to 
have an unexpected influence on the employment of the Japanese technicians after the end of 
the war.   
 
In March 1945, Mantetsu had 341, 836 employees, of which 93,815 were Japanese (Katō 
2006: 193).  After the war, a number of former Mantetsu employees became leaders in 
Japanese industry, politics and academia. For instance, Hagiwara Teiji, a former researcher in 
CRL, joined the newly established JETRO shortly after his repatriation from China in 1954 
and was a member of the first Japanese Trade mission to Beijing and Shanghai in 1956. 
 
On 25 August 1945, an agreement was signed between the Soviets and the Kuomintang for 
the joint administration of Mantetsu (Kobayashi 2006: 314). Two days later, on 27 August, 
the Sino–Soviet Treaty on Friendship and Alliance which had been signed on 14 August was 
made public.  According to this Treaty, the Chinese Eastern Railways and Mantetsu were to 
be merged to form the Chinese Changchun Railway which would be jointly administered by 
China and the Soviet Union with each receiving equal profits. The plan was for the 
administrative structure to continue for 20 years after which the railway would come under 
sole Chinese control.
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 On 28 September, Mantetsu was formally closed down and on 30 
September, the Allies ordered that the company be broken up.  According to Fukushima 
(1955: 178), an Allied Commanding Officer stated on 11 April 1946 that all of Mantetsu’s 
Japanese workers had been dismissed by the beginning of December 1945. Whilst the 
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Commanding Officer may have been technically correct since Mantetsu no longer existed, 
the reality was that a large number of Mantetsu’s technicians, including those from CRL, 
continued to be employed albeit now by the governments in control of the region.  
Fukushima (1955: 178) adds that those on the ground were not aware of their supposed 
dismissal.   
 
The Chūō shiken-jo (CRL) was established in October 1907 as a Kwantung Provincial 
Government instrumentality (Nagami 2006: 100) and came under the Mantetsu umbrella in 
1910.  Its primary role was to undertake scientific research related to industrial and resource 
development.  For instance, it undertook research into agricultural fertilisers and the 
manufacture of aluminium.  Its research functions therefore differed to its much more well-
known cousin, the Survey Department (Chōsa-bu), which undertook primarily cultural, 
historical and sociological studies.  Like the Survey Department however, the activities of the 
CRL were closely aligned with Japan’s plans for the development of Manchukuo as part of 
the Japanese Empire.   
 
In 1944, the CRL was removed from the Mantetsu umbrella and was renamed the 
‘Manchukuo CRL’. At one point, CRL had eight research offices and a number of 
manufacturing plants across the country but with conditions deteriorating, a number of these 
had been closed by August 1945. At the end of the war, it is estimated that CRL had around 
800 employees plus another 200 or so trainees (Mantetsu-kai 1996: 604). Around 600 of the 
employees were technicians or more specifically, scientists and engineers. Most had been 
educated in Japan and migrated to Manchukuo for employment opportunities, often to 
specifically work for Mantetsu. At the time of the Soviet invasion, CRL was headed by 
Marusawa Tsuneya, who had been appointed the Managing Director in July 1943.   
 
Shortly after the Soviet invasion, the Chief of the Survey Department, Utsumi Jiichi, gave 
orders for all company records – including the research records – to be burnt so that they 
would not fall into enemy hands (Sugita 2004: 279-280). Although this directive was also 
meant for CRL, Marusawa called all CRL employees together on 21 August and ordered that 
no facilities were to be destroyed and no documents be burnt. The reason behind Marusawa’s 
decision was his wish that the company’s research records be handed over to a suitable 
Chinese person who could continue the research for the benefit of China. Understandably, 
some people disagreed with Marusawa’s decision not to destroy the company’s records but 
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he successfully organised for copies of CRL’s research, complete with abstracts in English, 
to be placed in the Dalian Library where they reportedly still remain (Sugita 2004: 273) . 
 
In 1946, CRL was merged with the Survey Department and a number of other organisations 
to form the ‘Science Research Institute of the Chinese Changchun Railway’ (Hirota 1990: 
74).  With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China assumed control of the Institute. 
 
Employment after the Soviet invasion 
With the disappearance of Manchukuo, large numbers of Japanese lost their jobs but a small 
percentage, as noted earlier were hired by the Soviets, the Chinese Communists or the 
Kuomintang to work in various industries of strategic importance. Since the railway played a 
major role in transportation and communication between cities, many Mantetsu workers, 
particularly the technicians who designed and maintained the railway, were among those 
hired.  Some technicians continued doing the same duties which they had performed prior to 
the invasion whilst others were hired to train local workers to take over the operations of the 
railway.  To encourage Japanese skilled workers, such as economists and technicians, to stay 
in China and help with the country’s (re)construction, the Chūgoku keizai kensetsu gakkai 
(Chinese Economic Construction Association) was formed in 1946 (Marusawa 1955: 55).  In 
the same year, the Kuomintang introduced the Nisseki gijutsukō chōyō benhō (Law on the 
Drafting of Japanese Skilled Workers) which governed the employment of technicians 
(Nagami 2006: 99). As an inducement to stay and work in China, the Japanese skilled 
employees were paid well. In the case of CRL, Marusawa Tsuneya received ¥1,200 per 
month whilst Japanese workers under him received ¥1,000-¥1,100 per month. In contrast, 




It is in the context of the various governments’ need for technical assistance that Mantetsu’s 
reliance on Japanese technicians is important.  It is highly likely that had more local workers 
been trained before the Soviet invasion, Mantetsu’s technicians would not have been in such 
demand by the Soviets, Chinese Communist and Kuomintang authorities after August 1945.  
 
Repatriating the CRL employees 
As noted earlier, repatriation from Dalian began in December 1946. The commencement of 
repatriation was welcomed by most of the Japanese as they had been stranded in the former 
Manchukuo among people who were often hostile towards them. When the passenger list for 
 9 
the first ship to leave for Japan was announced in late 1946, the name of the Managing 
Director of CRL, Marusawa Tsuneya, was on it.  However, according to Marusawa himself 
(1955: 56), Satō Masanori, a former CRL Director, wanted to return quickly to Japan for 
family reasons and asked for Marusawa’s assistance in making it happen.  Believing that the 
Chinese would not allow both of them to leave, Marusawa volunteered to stay in Satō’s place.  
The Chinese gave their permission and consequently Satō’s name was replaced by 
Marusawa’s on the passenger list. In his memoirs, Marusawa (1955: 56) explains that he was 
pleased to see Satō return to Japan as he hoped Satō would be able to use his contacts to help 
find employment for former CRL workers who he thought may have been tainted by their 
colonial experience. Satō arrived back in Japan in 1947. It was to be 1955 before Marusawa 
joined him. 
 
Of the 600 Japanese technicians employed by CRL in August 1945, 520 were repatriated 
from Dalian in January 1947. The remaining 80 employees included a small number of 
women (Sugita 1990: 227). In July 1947, a further 50 CRL employees were repatriated.  
According to Mantetsu-kai (1996: 607), of the 30 that remained, 15 did so at the request of 
the Soviets and 15 at the request of the Chinese. That is, they were asked to stay. There is no 
indication as to whether those who remained were personally asked to stay or whether a 
figure of 30 was announced and the technicians were left to negotiate among themselves as 
to who would stay and who could leave. A further 20 left in September 1949 on one of the 
last ships to leave Dalian before the suspension of the repatriation program. The remaining 
10 were unable to leave China until a repatriation program, administered jointly by the 
Chinese and Japanese Red Cross was organised in 1953. 
 
Not all the technicians who ‘voluntarily’ stayed behind when the first repatriation ships left 
Dalian, actually wanted to stay. Some, recognising that their skills meant that they would not 
be allowed to leave, adopted false names in an attempt to be prevented from leaving 
(Nakamura and Kaneko 2003: 33). Others volunteered to stay under pressure from other 
Japanese. Tanaka for instance, ‘volunteered’ to stay because his Supervisor asked him to in 
order that the Supervisor himself would be allowed to leave (Nakamura and Kaneko 2003: 
33-34). The Supervisor justified his request on the basis that Tanaka was single whilst he 
himself had a large family to look after. Others stayed because of a sense of failure and a 
feeling that as the ‘losers’ of the war, they could not refuse to stay if asked to by the Chinese 
or Kuomintang governments (Nakamura and Kaneko 2003: 33). In some cases, the 
 10 
technicians chose to stay because of concerns that they would not be able find work in Japan. 
According to Yang (1998: 188) the Japanese government also wished that the technicians 
would stay as it would ‘help alleviate unemployment pressures’ at home and would help 
foster Japan’s long term interests in China. Whilst it is difficult to say how much influence 
the Japanese government had on civilian Japanese affairs in China at the time, some 
technicians did choose to stay in China due to concerns about their employment prospects in 
Japan.  
  
1949: Last to leave 
In the lead up to the departure of the last repatriation ships in 1949, the Chinese authorities 
requested that 10 Japanese CRL technicians remain in China. Marusawa immediately agreed 
to stay. Hagiwara (1973) suggests that Marusawa’s decision was based on a desire to help in 
the rebuilding of China. According to Tang (2005: 24), Marusawa once said, ‘I did not know 
about political economic issues and became a carrier of Japan’s invasion of China.’ This 
attitude hints at Marusawa’s decision to remain in China. Marusawa also encouraged others – 
including Hagiwara Teiji – to do so. In discussing his decision to stay, Hagiwara wrote that 
he wanted to quickly return to his research activities but stayed in China partly because 
Marusawa had decided to stay and partly because he was asked to by the Chinese authorities 
(Hagiwara 1973: 5). By the time the repatriation ships departed, 10 CRL technicians and 
their families – a total of around 25 people – had agreed to stay. The deteriorating situation 
on the Korean peninsula at the time meant that the CRL technicians who decided to stay were 
aware that it may be sometime before they could return to Japan. In fact, it was to be 1953 
before any were able to leave the PRC. Presumably the female workers were among the 70 
who were repatriated between 1947 and 1949 as there were no females among the 10 
technicians who remained after September 1949. 
 
After the last repatriation ships had departed, the 10 remaining CRL employees were 
assigned to a variety of projects in and around Dalian. With the introduction of the first ‘Five 
Year Plan’ in 1953, many of the Japanese technicians in the Dalian area, including the former 
CRL workers, were moved to other locations across China. The CRL men were assigned to 
projects in eight different locations across the country. It was from these locations that the 
technicians and their families were repatriated, in all instances willingly, at various times 
between 1953 and 1955. According to Hagiwara (1973: 6), the political instability in 
Indochina was the reason behind the timing of his repatriation. 
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On 16 January 1955, Marusawa and four other Japanese technicians from other organisations 
working in the same location were told to prepare to leave (Tang 2005: 33). They arrived 
back in Maizuru on the Japan Sea coast in February 1955. Marusawa was the last CRL 
technician to be repatriated.   
 
The repatriation of the last 10 CRL employees (and their families) was typically complex.  
On the one hand, their repatriation was involuntary in that their Chinese employers decided 
the timing of their departure but at the same time, it was voluntary in that the technicians 
were now eager to return to Japan.  Yet, this complexity at the end of the technicians’ stay in 
China should not detract from the fact that they had volunteered to remain in China in 1949.    
 
Reasons to stay 
There were three main reasons why the Japanese technicians chose to remain in China. The 
first was survival. This was most pronounced in the initial stages of repatriation when the 
economic situation in Japan was at its most severe. At such a time, the technicians 
rationalised that it would be difficult to find work in Japan so it was better to stay in China 
where they at least had a job (Kobayashi 2000: 168). In effect, it was a pragmatic decision.  
The second reason was a sense of responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War which became 
manifest in a wish to assist China. Marusawa’s comment about his unintentional role in 
Japan’s incursion into China reflects this attitude. A third reason is loyalty, in particular, 
loyalty to their colleagues or superiors. Hagiwara’s decision to stay is an example of this 
attitude. Hagiwara had known and worked with Marusawa for many years and felt enormous 
loyalty to him. Speaking about his decision to stay, Hagiwara said, ‘As a Japanese, 
Marusawa felt responsibility for the war and he was determined to stay to help with the 
building of a new China … I stayed to encourage Marusawa’ (in Tang 2005: 28). 
Marusawa’s decision to allow Satō to leave in his place in the belief that Satō could assist the 
former CRL workers find work in Japan is also an example of a sense of loyalty to his staff, 
impacting on the decision to stay. Irrespective of an individual’s reasons for deciding to stay, 
the fact that they did, shows that immediate repatriation was not their only goal.  
 
At the same time, it must be recognised that the repatriation of any of CRL employees at any 
time, shows elements of both voluntary and involuntary stay.  For instance, it was May 1946 
before anyone was repatriated from the former Manchukuo and consequently the Japanese 
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employees could not have left even if they wanted to. That is, they were involuntarily forced 
to stay.  The length of involuntary stay depended on a number of factors not least of which 
was the organisation of the repatriation process itself. For those who were able to leave on 
the first ships to leave Dalian, the length of their involuntary stay was less than a year, but for 
those wanting to leave but couldn’t, the length of their involuntary stay depended on when 
they were able to leave.   
 
Finally, this paper has used the example of the technicians in Mantetsu’s CRL to demonstrate 
that not all Japanese civilians overseas at the time of the Japanese surrender chose to return to 
Japan at their first opportunity. Rather the example of the technicians illustrates the 
complexities of the repatriation of the Japanese in Manchukuo, both in terms of their own 
wishes and the wider political circumstances in which they found themselves. Most Japanese 
civilians may have wanted to return to Japan as soon as possible but it was not the case for all 
Japanese. Importantly, their predicament was also initially affected by the lack of references 
to Japanese civilians in the Potsdam Declaration. Consequently, it was some time before any 
Japanese civilians were in a position whereby they had the opportunity to make a choice as to 
whether to stay in China or return to Japan. As a result, all Japanese were forced to stay 
involuntarily in China until repatriation could be arranged. Once repatriation began, a 
number of Japanese – including some of the technicians who had worked for CRL - 
voluntarily decided to stay in China - at least in the short to medium term. The reasons 
behind the technicians’ decision to stay were varied. For some, the decision was a pragmatic 
one based on a belief that their employment opportunities at that time were better in China 
than in Japan. But for others, their decision to stay was based on a sense of responsibility for 
Japan’s activities in China (e.g. Marusawa) or a sense of loyalty to colleagues (e.g. 
Hagiwara). Irrespective of their individual reasons for choosing to stay, the fact that they did 
not choose to return to Japan at the first opportunity they had, and therefore delayed 
repatriation undermines the assumption that all of the Japanese civilians in Manchukuo at the 
end of the war, wanted to be repatriated as soon as possible.  
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1
 ‘Japanese’ in this context refers to citizens who were descended from people born in the Japanese naichi or 
mainland and excludes the Japanese citizens from Japan’s former colonies in Korea and Taiwan who, under 
Japanese colonial policies, were Japanese citizens. 
2
 See for instance, Narita (2003), Trefalt (2007)  Ward (2006) and Watt (2010).,  
3
 In South East Asia, a lack of shipping and the British decision to classify the Japanese as ‘Surrendered Enemy 
Personnel’ (SEPs) and use them as a source of labour, meant that many former Japanese soldiers were not 
repatriated until 1947. 
4
 For details on the Japanese population in Japanese controlled areas before 1932 see Matsuaka (2001). 
5
 The Soviet Union and China continued to jointly administer the Liaotung Peninsula until 1949. 
6
 Wu (2004: 69) suggests that approximately 1000 Japanese privately returned to Japan between 1958 and 1976. 
7
 The Headquarters were moved to Hsinking in 1943. 
8
 Control of Chinese Changchun Railways was transferred to China in 1952.  
9
 At the time, Egoloff, the white Russian Director of the ‘Science Research Institute of the Chinese Changchun 
Railway’ earned ¥6,000 per month.   
